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SOME PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
IN THE U. S. ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA*
WILLIAM R. WILLARD
American troops entered Korea and established a military govern-
ment shortly after the capitulation of Japan in August, 1945. They
found a country which, although spared the physical destruction of
bombing and ground fighting, showed the physical deterioration asso-
ciated with lack of maintenance during the war years. Roads were bad
and made travel difficult; buildings, especially hospitals, were dirty,
worn, and desolate; laboratories were exhausted of supplies, with equip-
ment worn out and broken; communications were almost negligible.
The people were poorly equipped by training or culture to govern
themselves adequately. The discipline imposed by their former Japanese
governors had given them little of the self-discipline essential to good
self-government. The Koreans had occupied under the Japanese only
positions of subordinate responsibility in government or industry. The
opportunities for education were limited, and relatively few had been
able to secure a professional education.
On the basis of sketchy information, it was anticipated at the time of
occupation that disease would be great. Typhus was feared as the major
problem during the winter. Smallpox was a cause of concern, but it
was believed, erroneously, that the vaccination programs of previous
years would keep this disease under fair control. During the summer the
intestinal diseases and malaria would be problems. In view of poor
sanitation and the use of night-soil, precautions would be needed to pro-
tect troops from intestinal parasites. Drinking water would require treat-
ment to render it safe, and a venereal disease program for troops would
also be required. For some other diseases, such as Japanese B enceph-
alitis, no one knew just what to expect.
Because of these anticipated problems and the need for information,
it was important to develop promptly a good Korean public health
organization to acquire communicable disease intelligence, and to in-
stitute control measures.
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The evident Korean hostility toward the Japanese made it seem
expedientand inkeepingwithAmericanpolicytoward a liberated nation
toremoveallJapanese frompublicoffice, and as rapidly aspossible they,
with a few exceptions, were repatriated to Japan. This resulted in a
serious shortage ofqualified civilians forpublic health work.
TheAmerican personnel problem was no less serious in its own way.
The Army readjustment policy returned troops rapidly to the United
States so that relatively few officers or enlisted men who entered Korea
early in the occupation stayed more than a few months. This rapid
turnover made effective work difficult. The problem was further
aggravated by personnel shortages. Many officers trained for military
government were retained in the United States and separated from
service; many subsequently assigned to this duty had no understanding
ofthepurposeofthe occupation and, indeed, had no interest in anything
but in returning home. In general, those who had training for military
government intheArmyTraining Schoolsdid better work and exhibited
a better attitude than did those not so trained.
Of particular concern was the attitude of medical officers who were
assigned without preparation; some of these displayed a feeling of
resentment and helplessness when they learned that they would be
Health Officers. Somehow public health appeared to them as a highly
complicated specialty with which the average medical officer could not
hope to cope. Fortunately, some of these men took hold very well
when confronted with the problems in the field. The assignment called
less for technical knowledge than for common sense and a willingness
to tackle the work. One of the most effective early public health jobs in
Korea was accomplished in an area without a medical officer by a young
officer who was sincerely interested in the work.
The lack of trained professional personnel for military government
was aggravated by a shortage of service personnel, especially stenog-
raphers and typists. The time of those professionally trained could
have been utilized togreater advantage had trained administrative assist-
ants been available in adequate numbers.
Supplies were slow in arriving, and the shortage of office supplies,
typewriters, and motor vehicles was felt as keenly as was the shortage
of scientific equipment and such epidemic control material as smallpox
vaccine and DDT.
All of this seriously impaired the efficiency of the professional
personnel. As an example, the officer in charge of laboratories spent
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much time in "scrounging" material from other Army units to re-
habilitate laboratory equipment, or to make culture media, in waiting
for a jeep to take him to the laboratory, in making out payrolls for his
Korean employees, in negotiating with the finance office of the Military
Government for expense money, and in typing his own reports, etc.,
rather than in directing the manufacture of biological products or in
training Koreans todo the laboratory work.
The Army took over the detailed administration of government, and
directed itsoperation as theJapanese were relieved. However, in keeping
with the policy of regarding Korea as a liberated nation, Koreans were
found and trained to take over operating responsibilities as quickly as
possible. Thus, each officer had his Korean counterpart, and, of course,
subordinate positions were filled by Koreans. Enlisted men in the
National Military Government filled service jobs for the Americans,
and locally, some of the more capable had operating responsibilities for
a short time. But the policy and the practice was to turn over to the
Koreans as much as possible as rapidly as possible.
The Military Government rather quickly reorganized the pattern
of government in a number of ways. Ordinance No. 1 of the Military
Governmentestablished the Bureau of Public Health, and under another
ordinance Welfare was added. Subsequently, the Bureau was named the
Department of Public Health and Welfare. The American conviction
was that public health is not a police function and cannot be developed
adequatelyunderpolice domination and bypolice methods. This concept
met with the approval of leading Korean physicians who recognized
the opportunity for public health to develop properly and to assume the
importance in government that it deserved.
Nevertheless, the administrative implications of this drastic step
were not clearly apparent, largely due to the unfamiliarity of United
States Military Government officers with previous Korean organization
and laws. Such public health services as reached the people, especially
atthe lowestechelonsofgovernment, had beenpreviously organized and
administered by the police. It was the village policeman who frequently
first heard of communicable diseases and put the control machinery,
such as it was, into operation. Reports were sent through police com-
munication systems in a country where there was no other decent
communication system. The policeman served in a sense as the sanitary
inspector and supplied health intelligence, in addition to enforcing laws
involving public health matters. Ordinance No. 1 stripped him of these
663YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
powers and responsibilities, and being human, especially an Oriental
human, he didn't like it. As a result, in several areas the police refused
to have anything further to do with public health, even to the extent of
closing the channels of communication of health intelligence. The net
effect was to destroy temporarily the public health organization,
especially at the lower government levels and particularly in rural areas,
long before any substitute organization could be created.
Ordinance No. 1, and some succeeding ordinances, created confusion
as to responsibility for public health administration among the various
agencies ofgovernment. Itwas not realized in how many different police
lawspublichealth matters werecovered. Venereal disease control among
prostitutes, sanitation of eating establishments, public bath houses, and
other matters were retained under police control by virtue of their
coverage in the Peace Preservation Section ofpolice laws which were not
broken down in the new ordinances with appropriate transferral of
jurisdiction to the Department of Public Health and Welfare. Similar
jurisdictional difficulties arose with the Department of Agriculture con-
cerning veterinary problems, with the Justice Department concerning
vital statistics, and with the Department of Commerce concerning drug
manufacture. To secure additional legislation or administrative agree-
ments with the departments concerned proved difficult and time-con-
suming. The delays caused dissatisfaction in the field, but in spite of
these delays, some men established local relationships which enabled
them to solve pressing local problems.
The Department of Public Health and Welfare soon after its
creation was organized as follows:
Researc J&a
Bureau Memorandum No. 1 was issued in November, 1945, direct-
ing each province to organize a Bureau of Public Health and Welfare,
which for all pra'ctical purposes was a replica, on a smaller scale, of the
National Department. Due to the scarcity of personnel, most provinces
were only partially organized, with several consolidated sections,- al-
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though some had an almost complete organization. The provinces were
given wide latitude in organizing their subordinate governmental units.
At the same time other National Departments were directing the or-
ganization of their counterparts in the provincial governments, but it
became apparent that an overall direction and coordination was neces-
sary to ensure balance in the relative size of different agencies of govern-
ment and to put a ceiling on the number of employees. It was realized
that Korea was not a rich country, and that eventually she would have
to support this government from her own resources. American officers
were trying to create ideal organizations as they conceived them, and
the Korean Director of the Department of Public Health and Welfare
expressed the fear held by many people that perhaps the Military
Government was creating an organization of such size that Korea
could not afford to support it.
Accordingly, a Secretariat of Provincial Affairs was created and
directed to draw up a plan of organization for all echelons of govern-
ment, aswell asto approve budgets within its limit. Thisworkprogressed
slowly because of the difficulty in reaching compromises with the agen-
cies concerned, particularly with the Department of Public Health and
Welfare. On the one hand was the concept that Korea had always
managed with very little health work or organization, and now was no
time to make an expensive expansion of the organization, particularly in
view of the very limited trained personnel available to implement an
effective program. In contrast, however, was the necessity of capitalizing
on this unique opportunity to give Korea an effective public health
organization. A skeleton organization at all levels of government was
believed necessary. Flesh could be added to the skeleton later, but it
might be difficult later to create the skeleton.
The problem was more complicated than this, however. The
provincial departments of Public Health and Welfare were already
organized more or less according to Bureau Memorandum No. 1. If the
Department were reorganized with fewer sections as required, it would
result in important resignations because Koreans, more than Americans,
will not accept a reorganization which means a comparative loss of
position in the administrative chain of command. Personnel was too
scarceto risk any loss.
Theproblem wasfinally solved, butonly after an exasperating delay,
for the provincial personnel felt they could not go ahead with their or-
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ganization and program until the organizational pattern was fixed. The
following provincial organization was decided upon as a compromise:
lpr -_
Ea:boratory| Jng
enti.stffA
A medical officer with no previous experience in Military Govern-
ment cannot visualize clearly the problems in the early stages of an
occupation. Those who had theoretical training in Military Government
Schools acquired some familiarity with the nature of the problems, al-
though theory and practice differed widely. The time required for admin-
istrative work far overshadowed that devoted to medical work.
Although smallpox and typhus, for example, represented major
epidemic control problems, the Health Officers soon found that their
primaryjobwas notvaccinating anddustingwithDDT, but inmaking it
possible for others to do this work. This required the recruitment of
personnel, not always an easy matter. Delays in defining organizational
patterns and policies handicapped some Health Officers in securing
authorization to employ the necessary help. Delays in establishing fiscal
policies and procedures caused some embarrassing delays in paying
salaries. Procurement of supplies required more than requisitions if
supplies were to be expected; it required telephone calls in a country
where the service was exasperatingly poor when not impossible, or
personal trips under difficult conditions. After procurement, the task of
arranging for delivery was not easy in a country with little public and
inadequate army transportation. These were some of the problems of
epidemic control for the Health Officers in the early months of
occupation.
The rehabilitation and maintenance of hospitals was a much greater
task than anyone anticipated. The hospitals needed coal, food, drugs,
dressings, paint, window glass, soap, instruments, etc. Considerable
"scrounging" was necessary to supply hospitals and much effort was
required to make the Koreans keep the hospitals clean.
In an effort to revive Korean commercial channels and to throw as
much work as possible on the Koreans, captured Japanese medical
supplies were distributed through Korean wholesalers. In many areas,
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however, there were no wholesalers and the Health Officer was respon-
sible for re-establishing one or more of these agencies and seeing that
goods were sold where most needed.
Before the office of Property Custodian was functioning the Health
Officer found himself trying to resolve the conflicting claims of Koreans
for the right to operate the many small private hospitals previously
owned and operated by Japanese physicians before repatriation.
Rice became scarce and inflation developed, creating problems for
the Health Officer. Special rationing arrangements had to be worked
out for hospitals, and difficult problems of adjusting wages for nurses
developed. Strikes by nurses were narrowly avoided in several instances.
The strike threat was usually related to the wage problem, occasionally
to political agitation.
These experiences teach lessons from which the United States may
profit if the Nation again has to inaugurate Military Government.
Advance planning for public health administration in Korea was
clearly inadequate. The Army did not realize the magnitude, complexity,
or technical nature of military government until too late.
The lack of knowledge concerning Korean law and the scarcity of
legal aid proved to be a serious problem. If the laws of various countries
areonfile with the State Department, English translations of Korean law
would have helped immeasurably. If they are not, this is one example
pointing to the need for adequate systems of public health intelligence
on foreign countries.
The Army personnel policy could be greatly improved. Not only
should the men be trained in Military Government, but as far as possible
they should be limited to men with comparatively short periods of
service and with the knowledge that they would be kept overseas not less
than a year. In addition, the objectives of the occupation should be made
convincingly important to them.
Medical officers must have some training in Military Government,
particularly in public health administration. This is more important
than is special knowledge about disease conditions in a particular area.
In spite of difficulties, significant contributions were made to the
public health of Korea. The most important perhaps were in control of
epidemics, in nursing education, in vital statistics, and in the organiza-
tion ofpublic health and welfare services.
Anticipating that louse-borne typhus fever might become epidemic,
plans were made early to combat this threat. Ten thousand cases were
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reported during the winter prior to the occupation, and it was estimated
that 100,000 cases actually occurred. Thus the reservoir of infection was
believed tobegreat. Plans were drawn up cooperatively bythe Surgeon's
Office, XXIV Corps, the U. S. Army Typhus Commission, and Military
Government officers, calling for the immunization of all military and
keycivilianpersonnel, refugees and repatriates, residents in focal areas of
infection, and all contacts of typhus cases. The plans also called for
DDT dusting of refugees, repatriates, residents of focal areas, patients
sick with typhus, and their contacts. Blankets and clothes of residents in
focal areas were to be dusted also at intervals. The U. S. Army Typhus
Commission was to delineate focal areas.
American personnel, utilizing Korean help, trained and supervised
Koreans organized incase-finding, vaccinating, anddusting teams. DDT,
dust guns, power dusters, vaccine, syringes, and needles were supplied
by the Army. Delays in the arrival ofequipment and supplies resulted in
much frustration and in uneven work throughout the country; however,
the critical areas received major attention, and an enormous volume of
work was accomplished. While typhus did occur in Korea, no serious
epidemics developed among civilians and the troops were free from
the disease.
Smallpox presented the most seriousproblem during the first winter,
occurring in epidemic form among civilians throughout the country.
About forty cases occurred among U. S. troops, with a fatality rate
approximating 33 per cent.
A study of the Americans who contracted smallpox revealed no
valid evidence of their recent successful vaccination. This pointed to
impotent vaccine or poor technique and carelessness in recording the
result of the vaccination on the individual's immunization record. The
disease disappeared among U. S. troops when they were successfully
revaccinated.
To meet the civilian problem a stock of crude vaccine of unknown
potency was available in the national laboratories. This was processed
and new vaccine manufactured, so that by May 1946 about 12,000,000
units had been produced. However, it took time to get vaccine into
production, and during the winter, while smallpox flourished, it was
impossible to meet the demands for vaccine. By May, production was
running ahead of demand, and there were indications that the disease
was abating. Some U. S. vaccine was provided, but the bulk was pro-
duced in Korea. Vaccine was distributed to Korean physicians, and ex-
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tensive vaccination programs were organized throughout the country,
but it is not known how many people were immunized. Vaccine pro--
duction was curtailed in May because of the lack of refrigeration
facilities in Korea. The likelihood of effective use of smallpox vaccine
during the summer seemed poor.
In addition to smallpox vaccine, the laboratory was able, in spite of
many difficulties, to produce typhoid and cholera vaccines and many
otherproducts in small quantities. During the firstwinter, it was not able
to produce diphtheria antitoxin or toxoid, although the need was great.
Inadequate quantities of these products were provided for civilian use by
the Army. Considering the many difficulties, the record of the laboratory
in Korea is outstanding.
The nursing program is another of the more significant contri-
butions. Prior to the occupation there was no conception of professional
nursing in Korea. Usually young and poorly trained, the nurse was not,
expected to do bedside nursing, but was literally a servant of the doctor
and she found her greatest usefulness in clinics. Such nursing care as a
patient received was performed by members of the family who lived
with the patient in his hospital room.
Using a few Korean nurses who had vision and a knowledge of
professional nursing, the American nurses directing the program es-
tablished six-week courses in bedside nursing and public health. The
short courses were attended by selected nurses from all parts of U. S.
Occupied Korea, and at the conclusion of the courses the nurses were
sent to various hospitals and health departments for work. Simulta-
neously, fundamental improvements inthecurriculumofnursingschools
were developed.
Even in the early months of the Occupation these partially trained
nurses were able to make useful contributions to nursing and public
health programs. However, as with all educational programs, this one
has a long way to go, and its eventual success will require not only the
continued training of nurses, but also of Korean physicians who must
learn to employ the nurses for the greatest efficiency. The physicians
must accept an attitude which will permit nursing to develop into a
real profession. The Bureau of Nursing Affairs in the Department of
Public Health and Welfare was quite effective and it will be interesting
to watch the development of nursing in Korea under its leadership.
The development of a modern vital statistics program may be
counted as another important contribution to Korea. Under the Japanese
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rule, thecollection ofvital statistics was a function of the Department of
Justice and all recordswerekeptinthe familyKosekiwherethe informa-
tion served legal purposes. Eventually the data reached the national
Bureau of the Census, and after several years various analyses were
published. Because of the delay in publication, and because the analyses
were not prepared for public health purposes, the vital statistics were
not a useful tool for public health purposes.
A new system was developed, grounded in the Koseki system with
which the Koreans were familiar, but which called for copies of all
death, birth, marriage, and divorce certificates to be forwarded promptly
on a standard form to provincial Bureaus of Vital Statistics in the
Public Health and Welfare Departments. By May of 1946, the pattern
of organization was clearly defined, forms were printed, personnel
trained, and the provincial organizations started. With continued guid-
ance this program should develop satisfactorily.
Fundamental to all these contributions, and others not mentioned,
was the separation of public health from the police, the unification of
welfare services, and assigning to them an importance in government
that they did not have before. With continued good guidance, these
improvements should outlive the Occupation and become permanent.
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